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Making Circumstantial Proof of 
Distribution Available 
Robert Kasunic∗ 
In a recent case that made national headlines, Capitol Records 
and a number of other record companies sued Jammie Thomas, a 
single mother from Brainerd, Minnesota, for copyright 
infringement of numerous sound recordings that resided on her 
computer.1  Much of the press coverage focused on the fact that 
this was the first record company law suit against an individual to 
go to a jury.2  Making the case even more newsworthy was the 
jury’s award of $222,000 against Thomas for the twenty-four 
sound recordings found to have been infringed.3  Given that these 
songs could have been purchased lawfully for under twenty five 
dollars, some claimed that the award was disproportionate to the 
harm.4  But the jury award was not the only newsworthy event in 
the trial. 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2816.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
∗ © Robert Kasunic 2008.  Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law School and 
the Washington College of Law at American University; Principal Legal Advisor, United 
States Copyright Office.  Nothing in this article expresses the views of the United States 
Copyright Office.  Thanks to David Carson, Jane Ginsburg, and Jessica Litman for their 
thoughtful comments. 
 1 See Complaint for Copyright Infringement, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-
CV-1497, 2006 WL 1431921 (D. Minn. Apr. 19, 2006). 
 2 See, e.g., Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog, RIAA Jury Finds 
Minnesota Woman Liable for Piracy, Awards $222,000, http://blog.wired.com/ 
27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-jury-finds.html (Oct. 4, 2007, 17:34 EST). 
 3 See id.  Apparently, it took the jury only five minutes to reach this decision of willful 
infringement, but it then spent another five hours on the proper amount of the damage 
award. See Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog, RIAA Juror: ‘We 
Wanted to Send a Message’, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-juror-we-
w.html (Oct. 9, 2007, 13:17 EST). 
 4 In fact, the defendant alleged that the amount of the award was unconstitutional. See 
Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, Or In the Alternative, for Remittitur, Thomas, No. 06-
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There was another controversy created by the testimony of 
Jennifer Pariser, an attorney at Sony Music, who stated that 
“‘[w]hen an individual makes a copy of a song for himself, I 
suppose we can say he stole a song,’” and that “[m]aking ‘a copy’ 
of a purchased song is just a nice way of saying ‘steals just one 
copy.’”5  Whether ripping songs from a CD that had been lawfully 
purchased onto a hard drive constituted an infringing act became 
the subject of much controversy.6  An article published in the 
Washington Post attacked the record companies for changing their 
tune on ripping.7  Whereas the record companies had previously 
stated that it was “great” to rip songs for use on portable devices 
like iPods8 they were now calling it “stealing.”9  The president of 
the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), Cary 
Sherman, explained the not-so-subtle distinction that arose in the 
Thomas case by stating that ripping for personal use is acceptable 
in most cases, but ripping to a hard drive that contains peer-to-peer 
(P2P) software, such as the KaZaA software installed on Jammie  
 
CV-1497, 2007 WL 4586690 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2007).  The Plaintiff opposed the 
motion. See Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or 
in the Alternative, for Remittitur, Thomas, No. 06-CV-1497, 2007 WL 4586692 (D. 
Minn. Nov. 8, 2007).  The government also filed a brief supporting the constitutionality 
of the statutory damage provisions of the Copyright Act. See Pike and Fischer Internet 
Law and Regulation, http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=virgin_thomas_ 
071203USBrief (last visited Mar. 1, 2008). 
 5 Eric Bangeman, Sony BMG’s Chief Anti-Piracy Lawyer: “Copying” Music You Own 
is “Stealing”, ARS TECHNCIA, Mar. 1, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/ 
20071002-sony-bmgs-chief-anti-piracy-lawyer-copying-music-you-own-is-stealing.html. 
 6 See Marc Fisher, Download Uproar: Record Industry Goes After Personal Use, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2007, at M05, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/12/28/AR2007122800693.html. 
 7 Id. 
 8 An archived version of frequently asked questions on the RIAA’s website, available 
at the Internet Archive, states in response to the question “What is your stand on MP3?”:  
If you choose to take your own CDs and make copies for yourself on 
your computer or portable music player, that’s great.  It’s your music 
and we want you to enjoy it at home, at work, in the car and on the 
jogging trail.  But the fact that technology exists to enable unlimited 
Internet distribution of music copies doesn’t make it right. 
Ask the RIAA, Internet Archive, http://web.archive.org/web/20070516072606/ 
http://www.riaa.com/issues/ask/default.asp#stand (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). 
9 Fisher, supra note 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Thomas’ computer, is a different matter.10  Songs ripped to hard 
drives containing P2P software are not personal copies, because 
those digital files are available to all other P2P users.11  In that 
manner, another newsworthy issue was born. 
The “making available” of a file, whether it is an authorized or 
unauthorized copy, on a hard drive connected to a peer-to-peer 
network was claimed, by the record companies, to be an 
infringement of the copyright owner’s exclusive right of 
distribution.12  The law on this point was far from clear. 
 
 10 Talk of the Nation: Rip This, and Sue That?, (NPR.org audio archive of debate 
between Marc Fisher and Cary Sherman), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
blogs/talk/2008/01/rip_this_and_sue_that.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2008). 
 11 This distinction begs the question of whether ripping for personal use is 
“noninfringing.”  Record companies have claimed that ripping is an “unauthorized” use, 
but unauthorized uses may be noninfringing uses if they are outside the scope of the 
copyright owner’s rights or if an applicable exemption applies.  Ripping, involving 
converting a file within a CD into another format on a user’s hard drive, is also known 
more generally as “space-shifting” for personal use.  There is no explicit exemption for 
the reproduction involved in ripping.  While the Audio Home Recording Act contains an 
exemption for noncommercial personal recording in 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006), the use of 
a computer and a hard drive takes this activity outside of the scope of that exemption.  
Ripping may therefore be deemed as a tolerated use under certain circumstances, even 
though it is technically infringing. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Tolerated Uses, 32 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS (forthcoming 2008).  A tolerated use is in part based on the choice of the copyright 
owner and in part a normative principle.  But what is the status of the use if copyright 
owners change their mind?  To use a phrase from Jessica Litman (made in relation to 
other uses): “Purists may want to claim that they’re illegal, but if they tried to take that 
principle to court, they would lose.” Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 32 COLUM. 
J.L. &  ARTS (forthcoming 2008). 
 12 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) states:  
Subject to sections 107 through 122 [17 U.S.C. §§ 107–22], the 
owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and 
to authorize any of the following: . . . (3) to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. 
Article 6 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 8 of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty require member countries to provide similar rights.  The Copyright 
Treaty states: “Authors of literary and artistic work shall enjoy the exclusive right of 
authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of their works 
through sale or other transfer of ownership.” WIPO Copyright Treaty, art 6, Dec. 20, 
1996, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html.  The 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty similarly states: “Performers shall enjoy the 
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and 
copies of their performances fixed in phonograms through sale or other transfer of 
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Traditionally, the distribution right has required proof of the 
transfer of a copy of a work in order for infringement to be 
established.13  Only one appellate decision has clearly based its 
holding on the theory of “offering to distribute” in the absence of 
proof of actual distribution.14 
 
ownership.” WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html. 
 13 See 2 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A](2005) 
(“Infringement of this right requires the actual dissemination of either copies or 
phonorecords.”) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].  Nimmer also points out in a 
footnote that actual authorization may result in a finding of secondary liability, and 
states: “But note that an offer to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public may in 
itself constitute a ‘publication,’ while the right of distribution apparently is not infringed 
by the mere offer to distribute to members of the public.” Id. at § 8.11[A] n.2 (citation 
omitted). See also 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 5.5.1 (2002) (“The crux of the 
distribution right lies in the transfer, not the receipt, of a copy or phonorecord.  
Consequently, someone who simply buys or otherwise acquires a copy or phonrecord 
does not violate the distribution right.  Further, an actual transfer must take place; a mere 
offer of sale will not violate the right.  Actionable transfers include not only sales and 
other dispositions of title, but also ‘rental, lease, or lending.’”) (citations omitted); 4 
WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:9, 13:12–13 (2007) (“[W]hile the mere 
offering to sell copies of a novel to bookstores for subsequent sale to customers 
constitutes publication due to the statutory definition of publication, without actual 
distribution of copies of the work, there is no violation [sic] the distribution right.  The 
emphasis on copies is statutorily based: the right granted is not to distribute the work, but 
rather, to distribute copies of the work, that is material embodiments, seen in the 
definition of ‘copies.’”) (citations omitted). 
 14 See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th 
Cir. 1997).  The court stated: 
The Hotalings assert that the Church’s libraries infringed 
their copyrights by distributing unauthorized copies of their works to 
the public.  The libraries did not record public use of the microfiche.  
Consequently, the Hotalings concede that the record does not contain 
any evidence showing specific instances within the limitations period 
in which the libraries loaned the infringing copies to members of the 
public.  But, they argue that proving the libraries held unauthorized 
copies in their collections, where they were available to the public, is 
sufficient to establish distribution within the meaning of the statute. 
The Church, on the other hand, argues that holding a work 
in a library collection that is open to the public constitutes, at most, 
an offer to distribute the work.  In order to establish distribution, the 
Church argues, the evidence would need to show that a member of 
the public accepted such an offer. 
On this issue, we agree with the Hotalings.  When a public 
library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its index or 
catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing or 
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The “making available” issue arose in the Thomas case when it 
came time to draft the jury instructions.  Judge Michael J. Davis 
sought the views of counsel on the proper instructions for 
infringement of the distribution right.15  The recording industry’s 
attorney, Richard Gabriel, argued that the distribution right 
encompasses the “making available” of a work.  In making this 
point, he cited a letter from Marybeth Peters, the Register of 
Copyrights, written to Representative Howard Berman.16  
 
browsing public, it has completed all the steps necessary for 
distribution to the public.  At that point, members of the public can 
visit the library and use the work.  Were this not to be considered 
distribution within the meaning of [17 U.S.C.] § 106(3), a copyright 
holder would be prejudiced by a library that does not keep records of 
public use, and the library would unjustly profit by its own omission. 
Id.  The posture of this Fourth Circuit decision was a motion for summary judgment, and 
the court’s determination appeared to be influenced by particular facts, e.g., (1) the 
statute of limitations barred consideration of prior evidence of reproduction and 
distribution, and (2) the defendant did not keep records of actual lending for particular 
works. Id. at 204–05. 
 15 See Eric Bangeman, Debate Over “Making Available” Jury Instruction as Capitol v. 
Thomas Wraps Up (Updated), ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 4, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/ 
news.ars/post/20071004-debate-over-making-available-jury-instruction-as-capitol-v-
thomas-wraps-up.html.  One of the first courts to assess the “making available” argument 
was a California district court in Judge Marilyn Hall Patel’s Memorandum Order on the 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in the long-running Napster litigation and 
Napster’s successors in interest. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 
802–05 (N.D. Cal. 2005).  In that order, Judge Patel discussed Hotaling and responded to 
the question of whether indexing file names in the Napster server was sufficient to 
infringe the distribution right.  Judge Patel stated: “to the extent that Hotaling suggests 
that a mere offer to distribute a copyrighted work gives rise to liability under section 
106(3), that view is . . . inconsistent with the text and legislative history of the Copyright 
Act of 1976 . . . .” Id. at 803.  She also stated: “There is no dispute that merely listing a 
copyrighted musical composition or sound recording in an index of available files falls 
short of satisfying these ‘actual dissemination’ and ‘actual transfer’ standards.” Id. at 802.  
Further, in distinguishing Hotaling, Judge Patel stated that Napster never had the 
unauthorized works in its collection. Id.  Finally, in addressing the argument that the 
legislative history of the Artists’ Rights and Theft Protection Act of 2003 (“ART Act”) 
demonstrated Congress’s intent to equate distribution with “making available,” Judge 
Patel stated: “If Congress wanted to make clear that the distribution right was broad 
enough to encompass making a work available to the public without proof of actual 
distribution, it was perfectly capable of doing so.” Id. at 804. 
 16 Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings at 6, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Njuguna, No. 4:06-CV-02341-CWH (D.S.C. Nov. 
15, 2007), available at http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDFfull.asp?filename= 
atlantic_njuguna_071115MotDisComplaintOppos.  The letter was written in response to 
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Ultimately, Judge Davis instructed the jury on what became Jury 
Instruction Number 15: [t]he act of making copyrighted sound 
recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer 
network, without license from the copyright owners, violates the 
copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution, regardless of 
whether actual distribution has been shown.17 
The jury found that Ms. Thomas infringed the distribution right 
as it was defined by the court, and assessed monetary damages 
based on her willful infringement of  twenty-four songs.  The jury 
appeared to want to send a message to the defendant; one juror 
stated that Thomas “lied” and that “[h]er defense sucked.”18 
In addition to the Thomas case, a number of courts have been 
grappling with the question of whether the distribution right 
extends to merely “making [a work] available” online.19  This 
 
a question by Representative Berman about an assertion made in written testimony by 
Gigi Sohn, on behalf of Public Knowledge, for the Subcommittee on Internet, Courts and 
Intellectual Property’s hearing on “Piracy of Intellectual Property on Peer-to-Peer 
Networks.”  That testimony stated that U.S. copyright law does not give copyright 
owners a separate exclusive right of “making available.”  While this is obviously true by 
examining 17 U.S.C. § 106, the question is whether the distribution right includes an 
offer to distribute.  The Register responded:  
In the case of a peer to peer network user uploading a copyrighted 
work onto his or her computer, making it available for other users of 
the peer to peer network to download, it is simply incorrect to suggest 
that the person performing the download is the only person legally 
responsible for infringement.  Making the work available in this 
context constitutes an infringement of the exclusive distribution right, 
as well as the reproduction right (where the work is uploaded without 
the authorization of the copyright holder). 
Id. at 6–7.  In the Ninth Circuit’s decision in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the 
court held that “Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to 
copy violate plaintiff’s distribution rights.” 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).  It’s 
worth noting that the Register’s letter specifically included the term “uploading” which is 
unclear in the context used.  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also included “upload” as a 
decisive activity, but did so in the context of uploading file names to a search index. Cf. 
supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing Judge Patel’s later memorandum order). 
 17 Jury Instructions at 18, Capitol Records v. Thomas No. 06-CV-1497, 2007 WL 
2826645 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2007). 
 18 Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog, RIAA Juror: ‘We Wanted to 
Send a Message,’ http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-juror-we-w.html (Oct. 
9, 2007, 13:18 EST). 
 19 See, e.g., Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Opposition of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV06–
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dispute about “making available” begs the question—is it 
necessary in order to prove infringement of the distribution right?  
Are there other avenues of proof that avoid a conflict with the 
statutory language? 
Having taught law students the fundamentals of copyright 
infringement for many years, I have always instructed them that 
copyright infringement may be proven by direct or by 
circumstantial evidence.  After making a prima facie showing of 
ownership of a valid copyright (which may be presumed from a 
registration of the work within five years of publication), a plaintiff 
must then prove “copying” by the defendant.  I’ve told students 
that courts’ use of the term “copying” is really shorthand for a 
violation of any of the exclusive rights.  That was clearly true in 
regard to direct evidence.  If a defendant admits violating any 
exclusive right, or there is a witness to the infringing act, such 
direct evidence will be prima facie proof of the plaintiff’s direct 
claim of infringement.  But is this true for circumstantial evidence?  
Can circumstantial evidence be used to prove infringement of the 
distribution right? 
As we have been told by courts on numerous occasions, 
circumstantial proof of “copying” may be proven by 
demonstrating: (1) access to the work by defendant, or a 
reasonable possibility that the defendant could have perceived the 
work, and (2) probative similarity between the two works.20  These 
factual inquiries, if proven, allow the court or the jury to proceed to 
the mixed question of law and fact—whether there is “substantial 
similarity” between the two works or whether there has been an 
improper appropriation of copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s 
work.  It is obvious from the articulation of the requirements of 
 
02076 (PHX) (NVW), 2007 WL 2409549 (D. Ariz. Aug 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/atlantic_v_howel/EFF_amicus_atlantic_howell.pdf.  For 
a dispute on this issue that precedes the Thomas instruction, see Defendant’s Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Elektra Entm’t Group v. 
Barker, No. 05-CV7430, 2008 WL 857527 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008). 
 20 There are, of course, variations on this Second Circuit analysis first articulated in 
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), such as the intrinsic/extrinsic test first 
articulated in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 562 F.2d 
1157 (9th Cir. 1977).  For purposes of this discussion, it is unnecessary to enter the 
debate on the optimal test. 
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proof through circumstantial evidence that it accommodates the 
reproduction right, but these inquiries—access and probative 
similarity—do not substantiate infringement of the distribution 
right.  First, the distribution right may be infringed without a 
violation of the reproduction right.  Second, proof of infringement 
of the distribution right entails additional elements.  Based on the 
language of § 106, the exclusive right of distribution involves a 
distribution of copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, 
lease, or lending.  Some form of distribution must be proven and 
not just any distribution, but a public distribution.  Proof that a 
copy or phonorecord of plaintiff’s work was unlawfully distributed 
is an element of the claim, but distribution cannot be proven by 
access or probative similarity alone. 
We know that direct evidence may be preferred, because it 
provides more certainty and is much easier for lawyers to present 
in court.  However, circumstantial evidence is a valid form of 
proof if it is relevant.21  It would seem that anything that can be 
proven by direct evidence could also be proven by sufficient 
circumstantial evidence. 
The rationale for use of circumstantial evidence to prove 
infringement of the reproduction right is the absence, 
unavailability, or limited availability of direct evidence of copying.  
In cases where the defendant will not admit copying and there is no 
witness to the act of reproduction, the use of circumstantial 
evidence may be the only option for proof of infringement of the 
reproduction right.  Moreover, even an element of circumstantial 
proof of infringement, e.g., access, can be proven by circumstantial 
evidence if there is no direct evidence of access.  For instance, 
access may be proven by showing a reasonable relationship and the 
customary practice in a chain of intermediaries,22 the widespread 
availability of a work in an area in which the defendant could 
reasonably have viewed or heard the work,23 or by striking 
similarity.24  Without resort to circumstantial evidence, most 
 
 21 FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible . . . .”). 
 22 See, e.g., Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 23 See, e.g., ABKCO Music Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd, 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 24 See, e.g., Arnstein, 154 F.2d 464. 
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copyright infringement claims of the reproduction right would be 
impossible.  We now seem to find ourselves in a similar situation 
with the distribution right.  But why has the law not addressed 
this? 
Direct evidence of infringement of the distribution right was 
usually not problematic given that in order to violate this exclusive 
right, the distribution has to be “to the public.”  The public nature 
of this exclusive right was typically transparent—someone gave 
and someone received.  Often, such a distribution occurred on a 
large scale and there might be many recipients who could directly 
substantiate how they received a copy and from whom.  However, 
this was not always the case.  The situation in Hotaling v. Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints25 is a case in point.  Although 
the book was publicly “available,” the absence of an admission or 
a witness who saw the copy of the work being borrowed negated 
the opportunity of direct proof.26  Moreover, in Hotaling, the 
absence of records retained by the library documenting who 
borrowed particular books was noted with concern by the court.27  
It would appear that such a record would constitute circumstantial 
evidence of distribution—it leads to the inference that if the record 
exists, the book was actually borrowed by the patron listed.28 
Proof by circumstantial evidence also appeared to be suggested 
by the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. when 
the court characterized the Hotaling and A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc. decisions as holding that “the owner of a collection 
of works who make them available to the public may be deemed to 
have distributed copies of the works.”29  This concept of “deemed 
 
 25 Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day-Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
 26 Id. at 204. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Thus the Fourth Circuit was faced with a situation in which it was clear that the 
defendant library had unlawfully reproduced the work and distributed that work in the 
past, yet those claims were barred by the statute of limitations.  There was no admissible 
direct evidence relating to the unlawful copy that was not time-barred and no 
circumstantial proof available that led to an inference of distribution.  The court appears 
to have strained to find a theory on which to find what it considered a just result. 
 29 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added) (citing Hotaling, 118 F.3d 199 and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 
1004 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
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distribution” appears to be virtually identical to circumstantial 
evidence of distribution.  The Ninth Circuit did not appear to 
embrace “making available,” in and of itself, as a violation of the 
distribution right.  The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court’s 
conclusion on distribution—“that distribution requires an ‘actual 
dissemination’ of a copy”—”is consistent with the language of the 
Copyright Act.”30  The court further added that deemed 
distribution applies only where a work can be deemed to have been 
communicated to other computer users or where “the owner of a 
collection of works who makes them available to the public may 
be deemed to have distributed copies of the works.”31 
“Deem” is a verb that is defined as “to judge or consider 
something in a particular light.”32  Synonyms of “deem” include 
“suppose,” “reason,” “judge,” or “consider.”33  Synonyms for 
“suppose” are to “presume,”  “assume,” “deduce,” or “infer.”34  All 
of these definitions and synonyms lead to the unmistakable 
conclusion that the Ninth Circuit was articulating a doctrine of 
inferential distribution.  “Making available” can be an evidentiary 
component of circumstantial evidence of distribution even if it is 
not found to constitute direct evidence of distribution.35 
 
 30 Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1162. 
 31 Id. 
 32 MSN ENCARTA DICTIONARY, available at http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/ 
deem.html. 
 33 MSN ENCARTA THESAURUS, available at http://encarta.msn.com/thesaurus_/ 
deem.html. 
 34 Id. 
 35 As this article was going to press, a thoughtful 52-page opinion on a motion to quash 
was handed down in London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1-4, No. 04-CV-12434 (D. Mass. 
Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/riaa_v_people/London-
Sire%20v%20Does.pdf.  Judge Gertner held that infringement of the distribution right 
does require proof that a distribution actually took place, but that a court “can draw from 
the Complaint and the current record a reasonable inference in the plaintiffs’ favor—that 
where the defendant has completed all of the necessary steps for a public distribution, a 
reasonable fact-finder may infer that the distribution actually took place.” Id. at 26.  
Thus, there is express judicial support in this decision for circumstantial proof of 
infringement of  the distribution right.  The opinion is also notable for the similarities and 
differences from an opinion of  Judge Karas on the same day in Elektra Entm’t Group v. 
Barker, No. 05-CV7430, 2008 WL 857527 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008).  Like Judge Karas, 
Judge Gertner rejected the argument that § 106(3) included an independent right “to 
authorize” distribution, finding that “to authorize” was included in § 106 to cover 
secondary liability and requires an infringing act to occur after the authorization. London-
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So what would comprise a circumstantial case of infringement 
of the distribution right?  We would need to identify facts or 
circumstances that would indicate that it is more likely than not 
that an unauthorized public distribution occurred.  One inferred act 
of infringement of the distribution right for any particular work 
would lead to a prima facie case of liability.  For multiple statutory 
damage awards, sufficient proof of infringement of multiple works 
and/or proof of willfulness would also be required.36 
Although an offer to distribute a work in some form does not 
prove that a copy was actually distributed, an offer to distribute 
would be relevant information about whether a distribution could 
have occurred.  For example, placing a work within a folder on a 
computer that offers the contents of that folder to other users of a 
peer-to-peer network would demonstrate that distribution to many 
people was possible, and may have been desired.  Not only would 
this fact establish the reasonable possibility of distribution, but it 
would establish that the distribution could have been to a wide 
 
Sire Records, at 21; see also Elektra, 2008 WL 857527, at *9–10.  Both Judge Gertner 
and Judge Karas also limited the significance of the Hotaling precedent.  Judge Karas 
stated that the Fourth Circuit was “apparently motivated by equitable principles” and 
stated that the great majority of courts have stopped short of endorsing the making 
available right. Elektra, 2008 WL 857527, at *6–7. Judge Gertner’s characterization of 
Hotaling went further.  Judge Gertner stated that there is “a lacuna in the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning” and that completing “the steps necessary for distribution does not mean that 
distribution actually occurred.  It is a ‘distribution’ that the statute plainly requires.” 
London-Sire Records, at 23–24 (citation omitted).  Where Judge Karas and Judge Gertner 
disagree is on the relationship between the distribution right and the statutory definition 
of “publication” contained in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  Judge Gertner found that the two 
terms are not congruent and that while all distributions to the public are publications, “not 
all publications are distributions to the public—the statute explicitly creates an additional 
category of publications that are not themselves distributions.” London-Sire Records, at 
25.  She concludes: “Plainly, ‘publication’ and ‘distribution’ are not identical.” Id. at 26.  
Judge Karas came to the opposite conclusion, finding that distribution and publication are 
congruent. Elektra, 2008 WL 857527, at *4–6.  Yet, Judge Karas “hesitate[d] in equating 
this avenue of liability with the contourless ‘make available’ right proposed by the 
Plaintiff.” Id. at *6.  Judge Karas held that a Plaintiff seeking to use the offer to distribute 
prong of the definition of publication, must also fulfill the further pleading requirement of 
alleging that the offer to distribute was for the purpose of further distribution, public 
performance or display. Id. at *8.  It would appear that even if plead properly, the 
Plaintiff would have the obligation of proving such an allegation.  It is hard to conceive 
of direct proof of an offer for the purpose of further distribution, and therefore likely that 
circumstantial evidence will be necessary to sustain the burden of proof on this point. 
 36 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000). 
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range of people.  Moreover, frequent or longstanding use of such 
peer-to-peer services and the number of works offered could be 
relevant as circumstantial evidence, as could statements or 
communications by the party making a work available.  Log files 
or other forensic computer evidence may yield direct or 
circumstantial evidence of distribution activity and destruction of 
such evidence by a defendant may provide circumstantial evidence 
to further other circumstantial evidence established.  The particular 
circumstances surrounding the creation of a shared folder are also 
relevant: did the defendant affirmatively create or place files 
within a shared folder or were the contents of the shared folder 
something that was the result of default settings or background 
operations of the peer-to-peer program itself?37  The circumstances 
that could further a circumstantial claim to infringement will likely 
vary with the facts, but if courts approach the evidentiary burden 
from the perspective of both direct and circumstantial evidence, 
precedential guidance could develop. 
In combination with circumstantial evidence of distribution, 
plaintiffs may seek to establish some evidentiary basis through 
direct evidence.  In other legal contexts where unlawful activity is 
suspected, there has been a role for “stings” and undercover agents 
 
 37 This information may be significant since copyright infringement is a strict liability 
statutory tort.  While secondary liability considers the level of knowledge by the 
defendant, liability based on direct infringement does not require knowledge. See 
ABKCO Music Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the lack of knowledge or intent to copy is not a defense to infringement).  By assessing 
circumstantial evidence, scienter enters into the analysis even if it does not provide a 
defense to the elements of direct infringement (the case based on circumstantial evidence 
is nevertheless one of “direct infringement” even if it is not based on “direct evidence”).  
In the case where the software company is the proximate cause of the harm to copyright 
owners based on the intentional design of the software, an action against the software 
company on the basis of secondary liability may be preferable to a suit for direct liability 
against an unwitting user of the software.  Traditionally, it was believed that an action for 
secondary liability is predicated upon an underlying direct infringement.  The reasoning 
was that the congressional use of the term “authorize” in § 106 was intended by Congress 
to address secondary liability and not direct liability. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe 
Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088. 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Consequently, we believe that ‘to 
authorize was simply a convenient peg on which Congress chose to hang the antecedent 
jurisprudence of third party liability.’”) (quoting 3 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 12.04[A][3][a], at 12–84 (1993) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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to document what otherwise might be concealed activity.  
Entrapment concerns are present, but where the agent is not 
enticing a defendant into wrongful activity, but rather simply 
duplicating unlawful activity by bad actors, such a sting serves a 
legitimate purpose.  In the distribution context, there has been the 
use of agents by plaintiffs to request copies or phonorecords of 
works from entities that were not authorized by the copyright 
owner.  In the case of Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, the 
plaintiffs utilized the services of an agent, MediaSentry, to request 
downloads from a peer-to-peer user.38  The use of an agent in this 
manner would appear to provide some direct evidence of 
distribution.  Together with other circumstantial evidence of 
distribution, this direct evidence would provide additional value. 
It has been argued, however, that “it is axiomatic that a 
copyright owner cannot infringe her own copyright.  By the same 
token, an authorized agent acting on behalf of a copyright owner 
also cannot infringe any rights held by that owner.”39  Does the 
second proposition follow from the first?  May actions by an agent 
of a copyright owner provide additional direct and/or 
circumstantial evidence to claim of infringement of the distribution 
right? 
In Olan Mills, Inc.v. Linn Photo, Inc., an agent of Olan Mills 
asked Linn Photo to make copies of copyrighted works.40  Linn 
Photo provided copies, but its lawyers argued that such 
reproductions were “authorized” through the agent by the plaintiff 
copyright owner.  The district court accepted this theory and held 
that Olan Mills had, through its agent, authorized Linn Photo to 
make copies of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works.41  The Eighth 
Circuit disagreed with this conclusion and stated: “It is well-
established that the lawful owner of a copyright cannot infringe its 
own copyright.  Nor can a copyright owner authorize copying but 
 
 38 Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV06-02076 (PHX) (NVW), 2007 WL 
2409549, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2007). 
 39 Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curae Opposing Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, Howell, No. CV06-02076 (PHX) (NVW), 2007 
WL 2409549 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20. 2007), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ 
atlantic_v_howel/EFF_amicus_atlantic_howell.pdf (internal citations omitted). 
 40 23 F.3d 1345, 1347 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 41 Id. 
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subsequently revoke its consent, thereby entrapping an otherwise 
innocent party into infringement.  In our view, however, the 
licensing theory advanced by Linn Photo is inapplicable.”42 
As the Eighth Circuit clarified in a footnote, Olan Mills did not 
authorize the investigator to waive its copyright, but rather 
authorized its third party agent “to act as if he were a customer 
who owned a copy of a copyrighted work.”43  Whether or not the 
agent was authorized was irrelevant to the question of Linn Photo’s 
authority to engage in infringing acts.  The Eighth Circuit found 
this view to be consistent with investigative schemes upheld by 
other courts.44 
The Eighth Circuit explained the agent’s activity as follows: 
The investigator in this case merely approached 
Linn Photo in a conventional manner and offered 
Linn Photo an opportunity to infringe upon four 
clearly marked copyrights.  Olan Mills did not 
authorize the investigator to validate Linn Photo’s 
unlawful conduct.  Indeed, the investigator’s 
assignment was part of Olan Mills’ attempt to stop 
 
 42 Id. at 1348 (internal citations omitted). 
 43 Id. at n.1. 
 44 Id. at 1348 (citing RCA/Ariola Int’l Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773 
(8th Cir. 1988); RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys. Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).  
In RCA/Ariola lnt’l, the agents’ activity was described by the court: 
Beginning in 1983 and continuing through 1985, the investigators of 
the RIAA Anti-Piracy Unit took musical tapes copyrighted by RCA 
and the other appellants to the businesses of the various retailers.  
The investigators would present a copyrighted tape marked with a P 
copyright notice to one of the retailers’ clerks.  The investigators 
would ask the clerk for the proper length blank tape to copy the 
particular copyrighted tape presented.  Then the investigator would 
feign ignorance of how the Rezound copier worked in order to 
persuade the clerk to do as much of the copying as possible.  In some 
instances the investigators received assistance ranging from putting 
the originals in the appropriate slot in the machine to completing the 
entire copying process.  The deposition of investigator Vaughan 
reveals that Vaughan made no effort to observe whether or not any of 
the bona fide customers copied copyrighted recordings.  In oral 
argument, counsel for RCA stated that such an investigation would 
have been too time-consuming. 
RCA/Ariola Int’l, 845 F.2d at 777. 
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Linn Photo’s infringement.  Accordingly, the copies 
made by Linn Photo at the request of the 
investigator were copyright violations.45 
 
Thus, while a copyright owner (including a joint owner) may 
not infringe his or her own copyright,46 and authorization by such 
an owner to another may be interpreted as a license or permission 
to engage in an exclusive right, it does not necessarily follow that a 
copyright owner’s authorization to an agent extends to another 
entity.  A copyright owner may indemnify an agent without 
granting rights, and thus, an agent would have no authority to 
authorize another.47  The fact that a third party receives 
indemnification from an agent of the copyright owner is 
insufficient to avoid liability.48  Moreover, even in the case of a 
licensee, that licensee cannot give more than he or she received.49  
If an agent’s authority is limited and the agent’s conduct does not 
entrap a third party, the use of an agent to substantiate infringing 
activity is consistent with prevailing precedent.50  The agent can 
 
 45 Olan Mills, 23 F.3d at 1348. 
 46 See, e.g., Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Infringement is the 
violation of an owner’s copyright interest by a non-owner.  The purpose of an 
infringement suit is to protect the owner’s property interest.  It is elementary that the 
lawful owner of a copyright is incapable of infringing a copyright interest that is owned 
by him; nor can a joint owner of a copyright sue his co-owner for infringement.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 47 In many cases an agent doesn’t have clear authority to authorize the infringing act of 
a third party.  A copyright owner can explicitly limit the scope of the agent’s authority by 
merely providing written assurance that the copyright owner will not sue the agent for 
direct or indirect acts of copyright infringement in the course of investigating abuses of 
the copyright owner’s intellectual property. 
 48 Olan Mills, 23 F.3d at 1348 (“Linn Photo’s indemnity agreement does not constitute 
a good faith effort to avoid copyright infringement.  Therefore, Linn Photo cannot rely on 
that agreement to avoid statutory liability.”). 
 49 See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 50 A reference in the Nimmer treatise appears to have been interpreted too broadly by 
some courts.  Nimmer states: “Likewise, it has been held that plaintiff may not claim to 
have been damaged by reason of defendant’s sale of infringing copies if the copies were 
sold to plaintiff’s agent, because such sale prevented the distribution of such copies to the 
general public.” 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at § 14.02.  While this may 
appear to indicate that an agent’s purchase is not a distribution to the public, on closer 
inspection, it becomes clear that this statement is more narrowly focused.  The statement 
cites Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bleeker (Shapiro I), 243 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D. Cal. 
1965), aff’d, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc. (Shapiro II), 367 
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provide evidence of the infringement by third parties51 or the 
defendant in a suit.52 
The production of evidence of a defendant’s distribution of a 
copyrighted work to an agent constitutes direct evidence of 
infringement of the work or works distributed to the agent.  But 
such evidence may also be used as circumstantial evidence of 
additional infringement.  As one court stated in relation to such 
direct evidence: “the evidence establishes a strong inference, 
which defendant has done nothing to rebut, that the employees 
would and did do exactly the same copying for customers 
unconnected with plaintiffs.”53 
The production of direct evidence of distribution of a 
copyrighted work to an agent by a defendant need not be limited to 
direct evidence.  Such direct evidence may be circumstantial 
evidence of a pattern of distribution of works, and as such a basis 
for a broader circumstantial case of distribution of other works.  As 
with all circumstantial cases, it is the totality of the evidence that 
must be assessed.  Making a work available is clearly one piece of 
circumstantial evidence that may be joined with other links in the 
chain of circumstances necessary to prove infringement.  The 
ultimate question is whether all of the evidence, taken as a whole, 
tends to prove that a proposition is more likely than not.  The fact 
 
F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1966).  That case dealt with the infringement of a book containing 
fifty-five copyrighted songs within the book. Shapiro I, 243 F. Supp. at 1000.  The 
plaintiff argued for damages for twelve works contained in the book. Id.  Based on the 
price of the book, the court found that not only would the plaintiff be compensated for the 
book’s price, but would receive an additional $13,750 over the gross amount received by 
the defendant. Id. at 1001.  Thus, in context, the Nimmer statement relates to the 
appropriate amount of damages when an agent paid for a particular lawful copy (the 
copyright owner thereby not being entitled to a recovery based on that copy since the first 
sale doctrine would apply).  “There is no evidence of any damage to the plaintiff.  Indeed, 
it is difficult to see how the plaintiff could be damaged by the sale because plaintiff’s 
own agent bought the book, and thus prevented the circularization of the copyrighted 
material to the public.” Id.  The Nimmer quote is thus irrelevant to authorization to 
engage in an act that falls within the exclusive rights. 
 51 Polygram Int’l Publ’g v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (D. Mass. 
1994). 
 52 RCA/Ariola Int’l Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 777, 781 (8th Cir. 
1988). 
 53 RCA Records, Div. of RCA Corp. v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 335, 338 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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that a defendant has made works available for distribution, when 
assessed together with direct evidence of distribution of some 
works in the defendants’ shared drive, creates a factual question of 
broader infringement of the distribution right.  The presence of 
forensic computer evidence, such as log files, or the destruction or 
corruption of hardware or software by the defendant, as well as the 
timing of such tampering, may lead to additional inferences.54  The 
credibility of the defendant or the defendant’s witnesses will also 
be a consideration in a circumstantial case. 
There is truth in the claim that direct evidence of distribution of 
a few works does not lead to the inference that all of the other 
works in a shared folder were actually distributed, particularly 
given the fact that at any given time there may be over two million 
file-sharers on a peer-to-peer network, sharing close to 300 million 
files.55  Yet, this argument proves too much.  The enormous 
 
 54 Log files may be particularly relevant to a case of circumstantial evidence of 
distribution.  It appears that some peer-to-peer software create log files that may reveal 
what particular files were transmitted and the IP address of the recipient. Such forensic 
electronic evidence, or the tampering of such evidence, could be important links in the 
circumstantial chain. See, e.g., Frank Adelstein and Robert A. Joyce, Fire Marshall: 
Automatic Extraction of Peer-to-Peer Data, 4S DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 43 (2007), 
available at http://dfrws.org/2007/proceedings/p43-adelstein.pdf. 
 55 Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curae Opposing Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV06-02076 
(PHX) (NVW), 2007 WL 2409549 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/atlantic_v_howel/EFF_amicus_atlantic_howell.pdf.  
The EFF stated: 
Nor have Plaintiffs established that MediaSentry’s downloads 
constitute circumstantial evidence that the Howell’s computer 
disseminated copies of the eleven songs in question to any other 
KaZaA user.  In fact, Plaintiffs’ own evidence makes this seem 
particularly unlikely.  According to Plaintiffs’ expert, during the 
period that MediaSentry performed its investigation, there were 
2,282,954 KaZaA users online, sharing 292,532,420 files.  Every one 
of the eleven songs at issue came from multi-platinum hit records.  
Even accepting Plaintiffs’ hearsay testimony as true, these facts 
together suggest that it is highly unlikely that, among the millions of 
KaZaA users who are likely to be sharing them at any time, these 
eleven songs would have been downloaded from Defendants’ 
computer.  At any instant, KaZaA users are likely to have thousands 
of sources for these particular songs to choose from and no reason to 
choose the Defendants’ computer over any other.  And while 
Plaintiffs may be correct that, in the aggregate, KaZaA users engage 
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volume of unlawful distributors does not serve to insulate the 
defendant from circumstantial liability.  While the particular 
circumstances are relevant, if a defendant has taken part in a file-
sharing network for any sustained period of time, this sheer 
volume may easily lead to an inference that it is more likely than 
not that, at some time, the files were in fact distributed.  That is, in 
fact, the primary advantage of circumstantial evidence of 
distribution—there need not be direct evidence of the direct 
infringement.  All that is necessary to prove direct infringement is 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that direct infringement 
occurred—that it is more likely than not.  The circumstantial 
evidence can be further narrowed by determining how many users 
were distributing the particular works at issue during a given 
period.  Such evidence may reduce the ratio in order to support an 
inference.  In those cases where a higher number of users are 
sharing particular works, i.e., the most popular works, those works 
could be the focus of the direct evidence by agents of the copyright 
owner.56  While any such inferences are rebuttable, the credibility 
of witnesses and the development of additional threads of 
circumstantial proof of distribution can be proffered.57 
 
in a prodigious amount of infringing activity, that general statement 
tells us nothing about the crucial issue in this case: whether these  
Defendants transmitted (i.e., uploaded) any of these eleven songs 
during the time period in question.  Plaintiffs evidence simply cannot 
bridge the chasm between ‘making available’ and ‘actual 
dissemination’ to anyone other than Plaintiffs’ authorized agents. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 56 It may also be noted that in addition to direct and circumstantial evidence of 
distribution, the copyright owner attempting to combat unlawful distribution of 
copyrighted works may also allege a case for contributory infringement of the 
reproduction right. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 
(2005). The direct evidence of the distribution of unauthorized copyrighted works on a 
peer-to-peer network will very likely support a claim that the defendant knowingly and 
materially contributed to the unauthorized reproduction of works by third parties, as 
demonstrated by the agents’ reproduction.  Such a claim would extend to every work 
downloaded by the agents. 
 57 As discussed supra in the text accompanying footnote 37, the use of agents and 
forensic computer evidence could transform a weak circumstantial case into a compelling 
totality of reasonably likely inferences.  A circumstantial case does not rest on any one 
inference, but rather on the combination of circumstances that tend to prove that an event 
was more likely than not. 
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Circumstantial evidence is not a panacea for the dramatic 
problem of infringement over peer-to-peer networks, but it, 
together with direct evidence and secondary liability, can be 
utilized in a situation where “making available” or mere 
“authorization” are incapable of supporting a claim for direct 
infringement.  Even though the nature of proof for circumstantial 
evidence for the distribution right has not undergone the same level 
of development that circumstantial evidence for the reproduction 
right has achieved, the circumstances which gave rise to the latter 
are now present for the distribution right.  Circumstantial evidence 
is an essential tool in all forms of litigation.  It provides avenues of 
proof to effectively protect a right where direct evidence is lacking 
or unavailable.  Moreover, to the extent that U.S. copyright law 
encompasses circumstantial evidence of distribution, there is an 
unassailable argument that the United States fulfills its treaty 
obligations regarding “making available” through the penumbra of 
U.S. legal doctrines and jurisprudence.  It is essential that the law 
in this area be developed in order to provide reasonable and 
effective protection for the rights of copyright owners. 
 
